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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces a conceptual framework and a computational model for individual 
tariffs for mobile communication services. The purpose is to provide guidance for 
implementation by communication service suppliers or user groups alike. The paper first 
examines the sociological and economic incentives for personalized services and individual 
tariffs. Then it introduces a framework for individual tariffs which is centered on user and 
supplier behaviours. The user, instead of being fully rational, has “bounded rationality” and 
his behaviours are subject to economic constraints and influenced by social needs. The 
supplier can belong to different types of entities such as firms and communities; each has his 
own goals which lead to different behaviors. Individual tariffs are decided through 
interactions between the user and the supplier and can be analyzed in a structured way using 
game theory. A numerical case in mobile music training is developed to illustrate the 
concepts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Individual tariffs existed at the dawn of the telecommunication history. Due to the limited 
supply and demand, tariffs were negotiated between the individuals and the telephone 
companies in a bilateral way. Individual tariffs faded out when the telecommunication 
industry began to thrive in the early 20th century under economies of scale. Users started to 
pay same prices for standard services. [1] 
Recent rapid developments in technologies, policy, regulations and law as well as other 
aspects in social environments have brought a lot of changes to the mobile communications 
industry and to the lives of individual users. Mobile services are no longer limited to voice; 
other value-added services and applications (e.g. location based services) are quickly gaining 
ground. Secondly, the power of individuals is rising both from the demand side and the 
supply side. These have been facilitating the movement toward personalized mobile services. 
Differentiated services need individual tariffs, where the pricing of mobile services are 
connected to the different requirements for service attributes and willingness-to-pay of each 
individual.  
This paper intends to develop a theoretical framework for individual tariffs by putting 
microeconomic pricing principles and full deregulation in a sector still governed by public 
tariffs and monopoly thinking. Mobile services not only have functional values, but most of 
the time are associated with social values, e.g. friendship. By incorporating social dimensions, 
our framework aims to provide a better understanding of individual tariffs. Furthermore, our 
framework intends to provide guidance to build computational models for implementation, 
where the determination of individual tariffs can be automated or semi automated so that the 
provisioning overhead is not prohibitive.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces basic concepts of individual tariffs; 
Section 3 starts with the incentives for individual tariffs both from sociological (section 3.1) 
and economic perspectives (section 3.2); it then brings out the theoretical framework which is 
built on user (section 3.3) and supplier (section 3.4) behaviors and their interactions. The 
framework uses game theory as an analytical design tool (section 3.5). Section 4 introduces a 
computational model based on the conceptual framework, where the supplier is a 
profit-oriented firm and the user is an individual; a numerical case of mobile music training is 
developed to illustrate the concepts. The paper concludes in section 5.   
2 BASIC CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS 
We define mobile (communication) services as those that are provided through a mobile or 
wireless user equipment, through a ubiquitous connection to facilitate communications 
anytime anywhere, between human beings, between humans and machines and between 
machines1.  
In order to define individual tariffs, the opposite is defined first. Public tariffs in 
telecommunication refer to the regulatory protected ability for an identified user to obtain 
from a service provider, by a bilateral contract, a set of standard prices for a set of 
standardized services. Public tariffs are common practice of current incumbent telecom 
operators. The number of services is limited and so are the choices of tariffs. A typical mobile 
operator offers 5-10 service bundles, each corresponds to a category of tariffs. User chooses a 
bundle, signs a contract (usually for 1 or 2 years) and pays a fixed monthly fee, which may 
cover some free voice minutes, SMS, MMS or certain amount of data traffic, plus limited 
customer support. Tariffs for usage exceeding the “free” offer vary among bundles; very often, 
the operator provides a subsidized mobile terminal. There is no interaction between operators 
and customers when signing the contracts. A customer has to choose/predict one category of 
                                                        
1 Our discussion in the paper does not include the “machine to machine” communication. 
services and tariffs which fit his/her needs best or reject the offer. The limited segmentation 
leaves a significant amount of demands from the users unsatisfied [2]. 
Individual tariffs in telecommunications refer to the regulatory protected ability for an 
identified user to obtain from a service provider, by a bilateral specific contract, a set of 
service specific prices corresponding to a request or a proposal from the user specified with a 
service demand profile and some duration.  
Per this definition, individual tariffs do not in essence include pre-paid service usage, or 
service prices offered by traffic or service aggregators or resellers. Likewise, they are not 
covered in the service consumption derived from a user-specific mix of publicly offered and 
tariffed services. One could also use the term “individual ratings” to express the same. 
The users of individual tariffs are the recipients of services; if there is a subscription, the user 
can also be called a subscriber.  
The service provider/supplier is defined in a broad sense as the entity that provides access, 
content and applications, or a combination of them to users. Benkler [3] had pointed out that 
in addition to the two common forms to organize economic production, which are either 
through a firm under the direction of a manager, or through individuals themselves in the 
market following price signals, there is a third model of production. Benkler called it 
“common-based peer production”. The distinguishing characteristic of this model is that 
groups of individuals collaborate on large-scale projects following a diverse cluster of 
motivational drives and social signals rather than market prices or managerial commands. A 
well-known example is the Linux kernel project (see www.kernel.org) where thousands of 
people around the world collaborate to develop the core of an operating system. The third 
model of production is becoming more common and important in today’s information society. 
Already, there are mobile services created and provided following this model. For example, a 
service called cellphedia (see http://www.cellphedia.com) allows users to send and receive 
encyclopaedia-type inquiries between specific, pre-defined groups, through Text messaging. 
Since the group of individuals sharing a common goal can also be characterized as a 
community of mind [4] or a community of interest. We suggest that the “common-based peer 
production” can also be characterized as “community-based production”. We identify four 
types of service providers: 
a.) Firms. To distinguish them from communities as suppliers (see below), we name them 
operators. There are public operators and private operators. The former (e.g. most public 
mobile operators) are subject to a universal service obligation under the regulatory regime. 
The latter sell services to customers under only the restrictions of commercial laws (e.g. WiFi 
operators). The concept of universal service was straightforward in the past, which consisted 
of post, telegraph and some basic (fixed) telephone services. But the advent of mobile and 
Internet are demanding more components in the universal service system and expanding the 
definition of universal service. Here we just simply assume that some mobile operators are 
subject to the obligation. What of concerned is the economic implication of universal service 
for an operator. Any universal service inherently introduces substantial economic distortions 
by the interruption of market mechanism. Therefore a public mobile operator with universal 
service obligation will have to bear higher cost than a private operator. 
b.) Closed communities where membership is required. Only the members can contribute 
their efforts, and consequently the usage of the services is only limited to the members. The 
contributions from members of a community vary from knowledge, information, expertise, 
time, even empathy and sometimes money. 
c.) Open communities which do not require a formal membership; but certain level of 
registration and authentication are still needed to meet privacy policies and regulation. At the 
same time, open communities are also subject to liability risks and IPR issues.    
d.) And ultimately, individuals.  
3 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS 
3.1 INTRINSIC DRIVERS OF INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS 
From a sociological perspective, a post-modern society is characterized by its lack of 
dominant ideology, culture or fashions [5]. This is also reflected in the diversity of personal 
values which give meanings and directions to an individual’s behaviors. Not all individual 
users are willing to consider personalized services and tariffs. Some prefer a pre-determined 
bundle with little transparency and limited choices. But there are values held by a growing 
population inviting personalized services and individual tariffs. Here is a non-exhausted list of 
drivers that we consider to be fundamental.   
Individualism. We adhere to the individualism defended by Hayek [6] as the theoretical 
foundation of our research. Under this individualism, there are universally accepted principles 
under which man makes his own choices and take full responsibility; he is free to follow his 
own will, to make full use of his knowledge and skill, and he is guided by his concerns for the 
particular things of which he knows and he cares. Personalized services and tariffs of mobile 
services are reflections of Hayek’s individualism; where a person in a free society has the 
freedom of choices of services, at anytime and anywhere. It is also reflected in the freedom of 
service creation and provision, either to a family, a small community and group, or to the 
whole society.  
Self-identity, in a late modernity setting with rapid social changes, has to be routinely created 
and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual [7]. “How shall I live?” has to be 
answered in day-to-day decisions about how to behave, what to wear and what to use, et 
cetera. Modernity opens up the project of the self, but under strong influence of 
standardization of commodities from market. Market promoted individualism first out of the 
concerns the freedom of contract and mobility intrinsic to capitalistic employment, next in 
order to extend the concept to consumption to designate individual’s wants. A good example 
is the corruption of the notion “life style”, where the project of self has been associated with 
the possession or consumption of certain pre-determined products and services. The 
consequence is the suppression of the genuine development of the self. To move away from 
this predicament created by commodified consumption, an individual should surround himself 
with personalised experiences. Service personalization and individual tariff promote user’s 
autonomy by encouraging the user to define what he wants, not just selecting or accepting the 
pre-defined services, as part of a “framed” style of life. 
Innovation was defined by Rogers [8] as an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new 
by an individual or other unit of adoption. Innovation in the context of individual tariffs is 
user-centric, which is in sharp contrast with the supplier-centred tradition in 
telecommunication industry. The latter often innovates in a closed form, and uses patents, 
copyrights or trademark to prevent others from imitation. The former often uses open source 
(software or tools), shared knowledge to creative new products or services to accommodate 
users’ unique demands; user-centric innovations are often freely revealed [9]. In addition to 
the products or services they have developed, participants of user-centric innovations gain 
rewards from the innovation processes [10]. More generally, innovation is a specific 
expression of creativeness. Maslow [11] distinguishes “special talent creativeness” from 
“self-actualization creativeness”. The former refers to the level of creativity that belongs to 
geniuses such as Einstein, Edison and Mozart, which is exceptional. The latter refers to the 
creativity that is latent universally in ordinary people, which springs much more directly from 
personality and shows itself widely in ordinary affairs of life, not only in great and obvious 
product but also in a tendency to do everything creatively. The creation of personalized 
mobile services used to be inhibited by technology, knowledge and economic constraints. 
With the first two being greatly pushed forward nowadays, the research in individual tariffs 
aims to alleviate the last constraint and ultimately unleash the spirit of creativity from 
ordinary people. 
The recognition from others also plays an important role in our value as we are all social 
animals. In a networked society where physical boundary is disappearing, a little effort may 
harvest lots recognitions from people around the world. Recognitions from community 
members provide positive feedbacks to creative activities; it helps an individual establish 
self-esteem, which leads to the feeling of self-confidence, strength, capability and adequacy, 
of being useful and necessary in the world [11].   
3.2 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OF INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS  
A second angle we choose to look at individual tariffs is from economic perspectives. 
Specifically, we examined theories in the areas of price discrimination, willingness-to-pay 
and risk hedging, which justify the economic incentives to engage in personalized mobile 
services and individual tariffs for both the users and suppliers. 
3.2.1 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Price discrimination or price differentiation is a common practice in today’s business world. 
The concept was coined by A.C Pigou [12], who distinguished three types of price 
discrimination. In first-degree (perfect) price discrimination, each unit of commodity will be 
sold at a difference price, which is the maximum the user wants to pay. In second degree price 
discrimination (nonlinear pricing), commodities will be divided into n groups and be sold at n 
different prices. In third degree price discrimination consumers will be divided into n different 
groups and each group will be charged a unique price. Different types of price discrimination 
have different welfare effects in terms of maximizing consumer plus supplier surplus. 
Theoretically, first-degree price discrimination leads to a Pareto efficient outcome; Second 
and third degree price discrimination improve overall welfare in general, with some users 
receiving insufficient amount of product or service. Nevertheless, these users are better off 
than if they are never served.  
Early analyses of price discrimination were done under monopolistic settings and about 
physical goods; the supplier’s technologies involve no economies of scope, and usually 
possess constant or decreasing return to scale. Varian [13] provided a good overview of these 
researches. The general impression is that the firms conduct price discrimination have some 
market power, they may only shuffle the prices paid by pre-existing users without serving 
extra user groups, neither increasing the amount of product or service. In this case, overall 
welfare falls.  
On the other hand, Eden [14] has observed that price discrimination and price dispersion can 
occur in a competitive environment, where a price dispersion equilibrium can be achieved 
when competitors all charge discriminatory prices but the mix of prices vary among firms. 
Levine [15] argued that price discrimination is not necessarily the evidence of market power. 
In more situations, it is the optimal strategy for a firm to allocate common costs among buyers. 
This line of argument provides an alternative way to look at price discrimination. Furthermore, 
Varian [16] demonstrated that for industries that involve technologies which exhibit 
increasing return to scale, large fixed and sunk cost and significant economies of scope, the 
rule of setting prices at marginal cost is no longer economically viable: the marginal cost is 
close to zero. Pricing principle under this context should be that marginal willingness to pay 
equal to marginal cost.  
Current technologies already permit suppliers to track and trace user behaviours and infer 
their preferences so as to provide services accordingly. But most users dislike the feeling of 
being (passively) traced and concern it as erosion of privacy [17]. Individual tariffs invite 
users to be actively involved in service personalization and pay according to their willingness. 
It provides a possible approach to implement the idea of first-degree price discrimination2 
and push the market to Pareto efficiency, under a fully competitive environment. 
3.2.2 WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is the maximum amount of money the user is prepared to pay for a 
service, which is a measurement of value that the user put to the service. WTP is higher when 
attributes of a service meet precisely the user demands, which is also one of the economic 
reasons that call for personalized services and individual tariffs. 
It is quite unlikely, if not impossible that the supplier can identify all the demands of users 
simply by observations and offer every possible choice. Even if the supplier does, the burden 
of having to choose from too many options may lead simply to information overload and 
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exactly to his needs. Each consumer is receiving different services to a certain degree. 
frustrate the user. A plausible solution is to introduce interactions and change the role of user 
from passive audience to active players in co-creating value [18]. This has been facilitated by 
the rapid advances in IT and operation flexibility. 
By involving the consumers in a service design through interactions, users’ specific demands 
are identified and integrated to the service. User’s willingness-to-pay is higher than the 
comparable standard services, ceteris paribus. Franke and Piller [19] studied the online design 
of watches with over 700 participants and found that the user WTP even exceeds the 
best-selling standard watches of the same technical quality. More empirical studies which 
provide similar results can be found in [20]. 
3.2.3 RISKS 
The term risk is often used vaguely describing the presence of uncertainty. The four possible 
ways to provide individual tariffs for mobile services lead to different risks, not only to 
service providers but sometime to the end-users. 
User’s risks: 
Individual tariffs introduce more risks to end-users who bear little risks under public tariffs. 
Specifically, the risks can be over-committing or over-consumption which may lead to a 
service disruption. As a consequence, the individual may be denied access from others or 
access to the information society. However, unlike the supplier, individual alone has no 
means to hedge these risks as he does not alone have access to risk pooling or aggregation 
other than savings. He can only rely on the planning or replanning of his own resources, till 
used up or replenished.    
Supplier’s risks: 
Suppliers, be them firms, communities or even individuals, share a common goal when 
providing individual tariffs: to minimize risks. The thinking of sure/certain profit from users 
is currently dominant in mobile as well as other telecommunication industry. Individual tariffs 
are calling for a change to allow uncertainty in revenue from each individual user. The 
guiding principle, which has already been recognized in insurance industry for hundreds of 
years, is to have a positive profit on average. Insurance alleviates financial losses by 
transferring risk of loss from one entity to another by method such as pooling. Various models 
and computational techniques have been developed over years for life and non-life 
insurances/reinsurance [21]. Although has long been used in telecommunication, pooling was 
only limited to capacity estimation. There is no research applying the “pooling” thinking to 
differentiated telecommunication services and tariffs, where the focus will be on pooling the 
user demands and willingness-to-pay for a service. At individual level, each user’s demands 
for a service may seem unique and serving them may be costly. But for a supplier who serves 
many users, the pooling of the demands offer market potential. Furthermore, by pooling, the 
negative profits from individual users are allowed as long as the aggregate profit remains 
positive, which generates an overall robust business.  
Risk hedging for firms and closed communities, which have exclusion mechanisms to reduce 
the free-riding problem, can focus on the degree of heterogeneity of demands, the degree of 
heterogeneity of willingness-to-pay across members, the size of membership, et cetera. For 
open communities, the non-exclusiveness characteristic allows free-riding to kick in. 
3.3 USER BEHAVIOUR 
The concept Homo economicus or economic man describes a model of man who seeks to 
attain specific and predetermined goals to the greatest extent with least costs. Homo 
economicus can be characterized as fully rational and self-interested. The model is used 
broadly in economic and other social sciences. However, many researchers have found limits 
in this model [22, 23]. 
3.3.1 BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
The strict definition of rationality states that, an individual’s preference relation is rational if it 
possesses the properties of completeness and transitivity [24]. It means the individual is able 
to compare all the alternatives and the comparisons are consistent. Furthermore, rationality 
implies that the individual has complete information of all alternatives and knows about the 
consequences of his choices; he also has unlimited time and unlimited computational power 
to pick his most preferred option. In reality, such perfectly-rational person never exists. Over 
the past decades, a large mass of empirical data have shown violations of the rationality 
assumption (see [25] for a detailed review.)  
Herbert Simon [26] has pointed out that most of the time, an individual does not know all the 
alternatives. Neither does he have perfect information regarding the consequences of choosing 
a particular alternative both because of limited computational power and because of the 
uncertainty in the external world. The individual’s preferences do not possess the rational 
prosperities when comparing heterogeneous alternatives. Simon characterized this as 
“bounded rationality”. Model construction under bounded rationality assumption can take two 
approaches. First is to retain optimization, but to simplify sufficiently so the optimum is 
computable. Second is to construct satisficing model which provides decisions good enough, 
with reasonable computational cost [27]. Neither approach dominates the other. 
Following the pioneering work of Simon on bounded rationality, Kahneman and Tversky 
conducted a series of research on various types of judgment about uncertain events. Their 
conclusion was that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgment operations 
[28]. A recent revisit on these studies by Kahneman and Frederick [29] proposed a 
formulation in which the reduction of complexity is achieved by an operation of “attribute 
substitution”. A judgment is said to be mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a 
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that object, 
the heuristic attribute, which comes more readily to mind. Heuristics share this common 
process of attribute substitution; furthermore, the usage of heuristics is not limited to 
judgment under uncertainty. 
3.3.2 A SOCIAL DIMENSION 
The self-interested property implies that economic man is amoral and has no sense of right or 
wrong. He ignores all social values unless adhering to them gives him benefits; his 
preferences are exogenous and not affected by societal environment at all. However, this is 
never true. In choosing to act, individuals commonly consider the consequences of actions not 
only for themselves but others as well; they have social preferences [30]. This other-regarding 
(in comparison with self-interested) property of social preferences often embodies as altruism, 
fairness, teamwork, spite, etc.  
Mobile services, by bringing mobility to time3 and space, enable lots of social interactions 
which were hardly possible in the past [31, 32]. We contend that the social preferences of 
mobile services are decided by benefits that an individual elicits from the interactions under 
different social environments and with different people. Major factors affecting social 
preferences are:   
a.) Access to service, which is an individual’s obligation or rights.  
b.) Social context, by which we mean the social environment that an individual lives in, such 
as social location and social relationships. Under different locations and accompanied by 
different people, an individual’s preferences are affected by specific social norms and social 
relationships [33]. This is further complicated by a possible absent presence effect introduced 
by a mobile service, where a person is physically present but absorbed by a technologically 
mediated world of elsewhere [34]. 
c.) Content. The content of a communication service could be categorized as time critical and 
non time critical according the perceived importance of a timely service. Individual’s 
intertemporal preference is usually decided by a value function on the subject and a discount 
function on time. Empirical research indicates that the discount function is a generalized 
hyperbola [35]. Moreover, content could be categorized based on whether the communication 
is directly or indirectly motivated. In directly motivated communication, the action satisfies a 
need; the content is important to the individual, which can be ideas and thoughts, feeling and 
emotions, comfort and supports. In indirectly motivated communication, the action satisfies 
an intermediate goal, which can in turn lead to the satisfaction of a need; content is less 
significant in indirectly motivated communication, what is important is the fact that the 
communication has occurred. It occurs just to confirm a relationship [36]. 
3.3.3 MODIFIED BEHAVIOUR MODEL 
The differences in behaviour among users can be studied by analyzing the decision rules, 
which lead to different choices. Decisions are made based on preferences. The art of decision 
making is to obtain a complete ranking of the alternatives that reflect the preferences [37]. 
Very often, this is done by assigning a numerical value to each alternative. The number is 
usually called utility. Specifically, we consider two types of utilities of mobile communication 
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other hand, it means that a communication can happen whenever there is a motivation. 
services, namely economic utility and social utility. Economic utility in a given situation is 
derived from the various service attributes, or from the transactions that the mobile service 
enables, either with an economic agent, or with a machine (E.g. an application server). An 
individual elicits social utility from the social interactions that mobile service enabled. A 
preference relation can be represented by a utility function only if it is rational [24], where the 
preference must satisfy completeness and transitivity. Many preferences, especially social 
preferences, are partially rational or irrational. Therefore many situations can not be described 
by utilities but only by preferences. Here we assume that there are partial preferences, which 
can be mapped out by types and contexts. If a selection of a subset of preferences leads to a 
locally monotonic function, then there exists a utility function that can be used for 
computational purposes.  
A mobile service normally has multiple attributes, the utility function is then constructed by 
following the method from multiple attribute utility theory [38]. First, a utility function for 
each service attribute is assessed. Then a multiple attribute utility function determines how the 
level of one attribute affects overall utility vis-à-vis a set of assessed weights of relative 
importance. 
The individual tries to optimize his utility. Due to his bounded rationality, his optimizations 
are carried out in a much simpler way. We propose that the user builds his utility function 
based on a set of “perceived attributes” of a mobile service. The “perceived attributes” are 
different from the service attributes defined by the service provider using full technical 
specifications. For an individual user, an operation of “attribute substitution + 
simplification” takes place in such a way that it not only simplifies the understanding of 
service attributes but also significantly reduces the number of them. As a consequence, the 
individual optimizes on a much simpler utility function.  
The individual does not have complete information of all the alternatives; neither does he 
have full information of the supplier. Indeed, the individual learns from the service 
personalization and tariff negotiation process. He acquires more information through the 
interactions with the service provider, either explicitly or through inference.    
When making a decision, the individual uses satisficing rules and tries to achieve an 
acceptable level of utility before he stops. 
3.4 SUPPLIER BEHAVIOUR 
We also take a utilitarian approach when modelling a supplier’s behaviour.   
When the supplier is a single firm, economic utility is elicited from economic benefits such as 
profit or market share, which is generated by service offering. If we expand the analysis 
further, a supplier also has social preferences for his decisions (e.g. environmental 
preferences). There may be conflicting goals over a supplier’s economic utility and social 
preferences; he will try to achieve equilibrium/equilibria between them. But the 
equilibrium/equilibria is seldom computation-based but mostly based on ranking of 
preferences. It is because none of the existing models provides measurement or calibration 
instrument to quantify the social preference of a supplier. Therefore in this research, we 
assume that the supplier derives only economic utility from service offerings. A firm seeks to 
achieve maximum economic benefit and at the same time minimum risks.  
The goals of a community, when offering mobile services, are to achieve financial breakeven 
and minimize service provisioning risks. On one hand, community can buy or exchange 
services with a firm or a community. In a way, it plays the role of an aggregator who 
accumulates demands from its members and acts as an entity with more bargaining power 
than a single individual while negotiating with other suppliers. On the other hand, the services 
can be created, maintained and used by the members of the community. In this setting, users 
themselves act as a supplier. In this research, we are interested in the latter.  
When a single individual is the supplier, he can either choose to seek profit and acts as a firm, 
or to achieve financial breakeven. 
3.5 AN ANALYTICAL DESIGN TOOL: COMPUTATIONAL GAME THEORY 
Game theory, as a formal analytical approach, has applications in a variety of fields including 
evolutionary biology, political science, and military strategy. We limited our usage of game 
theory under economics scope. The main advantage of game theory is that it provides 
structured analysis of decisions, which are made as reactions to another player’s decisions. 
Over years, game theory has evolved to incorporate “bounded rationality” in its analyses [39]. 
Further, the cooperation between disciplines such as computer sciences, artificial intelligence 
and economics gave birth to computational game theory which enables richer ways of 
modelling complex problems of interactions in an efficient way by computers.  
Generally, the bilateral contracting procedure between the user and the supplier can be 
modelled by an imperfect information game, where the payoffs are the utilities that both 
parties receive from the service. Specifically, the negotiation process can be modelled by a 
recursive Stackelberg game, where the first player has a dominant influence over the follower. 
We empower the user by letting him move first. Different decision rules and constraints can 
be applied to investigate the equilibrium, if it exits, when the individual sets his service and 
price requirement to the supplier. Furthermore, different supplier strategies such as bundling 
can also be studied.   
4 A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
In this section, we introduce a computational model where the suppliers are profit-oriented 
firms and users are individuals. The overall goal is to determine equilibrium between a user 
and a supplier when the individual sets his service and price requirements to the supplier. A 
training service in the field of singing using mobile technologies for the instruction is studied 
as a case. 
4.1 A SERVICE DESIGN SPACE & A PERCEPTUAL SPACE 
As mobile and computing technologies evolve, technical specifications of a mobile service 
become much more complex. From a supplier’s perspective, it is common to define tens or 
even hundreds service attributes in a single service. We characterize a space that is 
constructed by these technical attributes as a service design space (or an explicit space). Each 
dimension in this space corresponds to a technical attribute of the service, including 
price/tariff.  
When reaching an agreement with a supplier, the user wants the details to be specified in text 
or a specification form. Service Level agreements (SLAs), which use to be a way to ensure 
quality of service (QoS), are becoming increasingly common to set commercial and business 
terms of service provisioning [40]. SLAs generally take the form of a structured template, 
with specific QoS metrics that are evaluated over a specific time interval or to a set of defined 
objectives. Thus SLAs are often written in technical language.  
However, an ordinary user usually does not understand most of the technical details of the 
service specifications. Even given a complete literal translation and additional explanations of 
the attributes, it is unlikely that the user has the patience to go through all the details. More 
importantly, user needs to balance among the value of each attribute and the constraints so as 
to optimize his payoffs. Such perfectly-rational user never exists. Instead, user demands are 
often expressed in plain (natural) language which involves little technical details. His 
perception of the service is usually much simpler. We define a perceptual space as a space 
constructed by the perceived attributes of a service (e.g. ‘a fast connection’). The perceived 
attributes are actually the results of a reduced mapping or an “attribute substitution plus 
simplification”. The reduced mapping is based on certain heuristics or as a result of learning 
of the technical attributes into features that the user in general can relate to. To reach a 
concrete SLA, a translation or a mapping between the explicit space and the perceptual space 
is necessary. 
4.2 MODELING THE USER 
Suppose users can be divided into groups which share similar preferences for a specific class 
of services. We employ a statistical method called principle component analysis (PCA) to find 
out the mapping between an explicit space and a perceptual space for a specific group 
interested in the same class of services. We assume the mapping is valid for a new user, who 
can be placed in a same group.  
Denote the explicit space as x space; the technical attributes as a vector x = [x1, x2 … xn]. The 
samples are the users’ revealed target values of service attributes in x space. PCA generates 
new vectors which are linear combinations of x1, x2 … xn. Denote the PCA space as z space, 
the PCA components as z = [z1, z2 … zn], and the principle component coefficient matrix as p 
(each column containing coefficients for one principal component), we have z=x p. The PCA 
method has two advantages:  
1. The first PCA components often explain more variance than the rest of the 
components, which can be left out without losing much information.  
2. The generated PCA components are orthogonal to each other [41].  
Interpretation of the PCA components is service specific. In reality z space has much smaller 
dimensionality than x space due to user’s perceptual capabilities. For a given service, we 
analyze the first few components which cover +/-80 % of variance.  
The next step is the elicitation of a utility function. User’s utility function, if it exists, is 
derived based on the reduced set of (PCA) components. Following the multiple attribute 
utility theory approach, a utility function for each of the perceived attribute is derived first. 
The second step is to determine how the level of one attribute affects overall utility vis-à-vis a 
set of assessed weights of relative importance. Multiple attribute utility functions usually take 
a multilinear form because of the mutual utility dependency among attributes. PCA 
components are orthogonal to each other, meaning that the value of one attribute is 
independent of the value of the other. Therefore our multiple attribute utility function can be 
simply reduced to an additive form.    
As mentioned in the beginning, mobile services involve lots of social aspects and individual’s 
preferences are most of the time context and content dependent. User’s revealed preferences 
may not possess the completeness and transitivity property, which are the necessary 
conditions to find a utility function. On the other hand, by working only in a perceptual space, 
it is easy for the user to set where he would like to be, and that is called a target point 
(actually a vector of values), which mixes economic and social aspects of the service. In this 
paper, we assume the user’s utility function is the inverse of the Euclidean distance from a 
user’s best reachable points (because of constraints) to his target point. A user maximizes his 
utility by approaching as close as possible to his target point. This is also a simplified decision 
process. The utility function has its limitations but to a certain degree, it also reflects certain 
‘irrational’ aspects: a user may not prefer lower prices than his target value ceteris paribus, or 
his social interaction preferences may overshadow better price. 
4.3 MODELING THE SUPPLIER 
The supplier, as a profit-oriented company, is assumed to make decisions based only on his 
economic utility. We define this utility, in the context of the negotiation of an individual tariff, 
as the expected marginal profit that the supplier receives from serving a specific individual 
user. The utility function is defined in terms of attributes in the explicit space including price 
and service provisioning costs. The supplier maximizes his utility, under certain constraints. 
4.4 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS – A RECURSIVE STACKELBERG GAME 
During service personalization, a user and a supplier negotiate on a set of service attributes 
and their values, including tariffs/price in view of a service level agreement (SLA). The 
negotiation process has a non-cooperative and recursive nature. It is modelled as an n-stage 
user-lead Stackelberg game. The individual user is the leader as he sets forth first his wishes 
in the context of individual tariffs, and not the supplier as it in supplier driven public tariffs. 
During each stage, each player tries sequentially to optimize his own utility taking into 
account what the other has proposed under his own constraints. Players update their 
constraints based on what others proposed as variable tolerance bounds as a learning process.  
Payoffs & constraints: the players’ payoffs are expressed in their utility functions. User’s 
utility function is expressed in a perceptual (z) space while the supplier’s in a explicit (x) 
space. Optimization of the user utility is carried out in z space and optimization of the 
supplier utility in x space. Players set their constraints separately in x space. The final SLA is 
expressed in x space in view of provisioning by the supplier. Since the user’s utility function, 
constraints, optimization and SLA are expressed in two different spaces, transformations from 
one space to another is carried out when necessary.  
Equilibrium: A one-stage Stackelberg game can be solved to find a Nash equilibrium, which 
is a profile of actions with the property that no player can deviate to achieve a better payoff, 
given the actions of the other player. In the recursive Stackelberg game used in our model, we 
define an equilibrium point as a point where no player can elicit a higher utility by deviation 
or entering a new stage of the game; furthermore, the point should also provide the supplier a 
non-negative payoff.  
Negotiation process: It has several steps.  
Step 0: In the beginning, the supplier advertises the offering of a class of mobile services. The 
service attributes (including price) and their values are expressed in x space (denoted as x_ 
offer0). The service attributes are translated into perceptual attributes, thanks to a pre-existing 
survey amongst potential users of the service, serving as a learning function. The individual 
user sets his target values for the perceptual attributes based on his preferences. The values of 
the attributes of the public offer from the supplier are also mapped into the user’s perceptual 
space: it serves as an initial reference point for the user (denoted as z_offer0). 
Step 1: User optimizes his utility in z space, under his own constraints and taking into 
consideration the supplier’s offer. Denote the user’s choice in z space as z_user, which is a 
vector. User’s objective at stage i is to maximize his utility z_user_utility(z_ useri), subject to 
z_constraint_user(z_ useri, z_ offer(i-1)) ≤ 0. The constraints can be linear and nonlinear. i=1, 
2 … k, represents the round of negotiation (i-th stage of the game). z_offer(i-1) represents the 
supplier’s offer in the (i-1)-th round. The result of user’s optimization at stage i is denoted as 
z_user_resulti ; it is then transformed into x space as x_user_resulti.  
Step 2: User decides whether to stop or not, based on his own decision rules. In case of the 
former, he may opt out to take the public offer or to negotiate with another supplier. If the 
user decides to continue the present negotiation, he communicates with the operator about his 
request, which is x_user_resulti. The user may at the same time signal to the supplier a 
possible tolerance region in x space.  
Step 3: The supplier updates his constraints regarding the proposed value x_user_resulti and 
the possible tolerance region signalled by the user. He then calculates his own optimum under 
the updated constraints. Denote the supplier’s choice in x space as x_operator, which is a 
vector. The supplier maximizes at stage i his utility x_operator_utility(x_operatori), subject to 
x_constraint_operator(x_operatori, x_user_resulti) ≤ 0. The constraints can be linear and 
nonlinear. i=1, 2… k represents the round of negotiation. The result is denoted as 
x_operator_resulti. The supplier then decides whether to accept the proposal, or to propose 
back his last optimized values. He may stop the game based on his own decision rules.  
Recursion and Stopping rules: the procedure repeats from (1)--(3) until it satisfies one of the 
following conditions: z_user_result(m+1) = z_user_resultm or x_operator_result(m+1) = 
x_operator_resultm. Either player can stop the game when the results show a non-convergence 
trend, which either appears as an oscillation (e.g. ||z_user_result(m+1) - z_user_resultm || = d, d ≠ 
0) or an amplification (e.g. ||z_user_resultm - z_user_result(m-1) || < ||z_user_result(m+1) - 
z_user_resultm ||). Furthermore, the supplier will stop the game when the result of his 
optimization leads him to negative profit. 
4.5 IMPLEMENTATION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
We have developed a tool to automate the numerical calculation of utilities and the 
negotiation process of tariff and service personalization. One off-line part calculates the PCA 
mapping between the explicit space and the perceptual space from a group-survey of potential 
users with latent interest in the service. The other on-line part decides if an 
equilibrium/equilibria exists based on the utility functions, constraints and decision rules set 
by both players (see Figure 1), and computes the equilibrium if it exists. The tool is 
implemented in a Matlab® environment (www.mathworks.com).  
 
Figure 1: Functional blocks of the implementation. 
We have created a mobile music service with limited service attributes to illustrate the 
computational model and to test the tool. The service is inspired by recent deployments of 
mobile music services by operators worldwide [42]. While operators are reporting quick 
acceptance of the services, some analysis has pointed out the unsuitability of current mobile 
music pricing mechanism [43]. By creating the numerical case in mobile music, we wish to 
demonstrate that the concepts and computational model can be directly applied to real practice. 
The service is called “mobile singing classroom” where the users can improve their singing 
performance by following the courses and getting instructions and content. Users are 
supposed to be students from a music college; the supplier is an operator assisted by teachers.  
Service Description and Service Attributes 
The user carries out a search (e.g. by sending SMS) in a database and finds out which music 
lessons he would like to follow. (e.g. Verdi’ opera: Otello, Attila). After selection, he can 
download the music and other instructional materials to learn and to practice. He can send 
questions to the operator during his lessons and will receive professional answers. The 
attributes of the service to be negotiated are listed in Table 1. 
Utility functions 
User’s utility is expressed in PCA space. Denote the generated PCA components as z = [z1, 
z2 … zm], we choose the first components which cover 80+% of variance. The utility function 
takes the form U(z) = [Σ(z-zi)2]1/2. The user maximizes his utility by minimizing U(z). 
We define operator’s utility as the incremental profit from serving the additional user, which 
is the expected profit minus costs from provisioning the personalized services. Operator’s 
utility takes the form U(o) = revenue-costs. 
Besides the value added “mobile singing classroom” service, the user also has a basic 
subscription with the operator. He pays a monthly fee for a bundle of basic services such as 
voice minutes, SMS, MMS and data traffic (all with capacity ceilings). There are several 
bundles for the user to choose amongst. Since the value added singing classroom service is 
based on the basic services, we assign a coefficient (k) to user’s bundle. This coefficient 
assumes that the user will use certain percentage of basic services ceilings for the mobile 
singing classroom. When calculating operator’s cost, we first subtract k*(user bundle) amount 
of services because they are already paid.  
Constraints and decision rules 
Both user and operator’s constraints are expressed in the technical space. The user has 
boundary constraints which are the region of tolerance for the technical attributes. Moreover, 
the user has budget constraints. The cost of total usage includes the cost of subscription for 
basic services, the cost of contract of the singing classroom service, the cost of investment on 
a mobile device which supports high end music functions. Further, the user has time 
constraints. He needs time to learn and practice. Finally, the user may have some specific 
preferences which can also be translated into constraints. Some of these constraints are fixed; 
the rest change during the negotiation process as the user adjusts his constraints according to 
the operator’s offer. The operator has boundary constraints. He also has constraints which 
guarantee the minimum the quality of his services. In addition, the user also indicates a 
possible negotiation space during the negotiation. Most of operator’s constraints are updated 
with user’s proposal in each round of the negotiation.  
The user stops when one of the two criteria is satisfied, i.e.: 1) the distance from one of the 
optimization results to his target point in his perceptual space is less then a relative value 
when compared to the initial situation (e.g. less than 5% of the initial distance). 2) the 
difference between two consecutive optimization results (user utilities) is less than a relative 
value when compared to the initial situation (e.g. less than 0.1 % of the initial distance). 
Operator can either accept the request from the user and sign the contract or quit the game 
without signing the contract.   
An equilibrium is defined as: 1) user wants to stop the negotiation and 2) operator makes 
positive profit. Then the negotiation stops. SLA will be signed. 
Numerical results  
We have three users which represent three types of students:  
User a: Just wants to listen to the music and wants to know how to perform or improve his 
background knowledge on certain types of music; does not want to ask questions to the 
teacher. The number of songs available is important to him. Due to the fact that it takes much 
less time to just listen to the music than actively learn how to perform, the user can basically 
take a lesson everyday.  
User b: Studies in an active mode and takes a lot of time to practice according to the 
instructions; eager to ask questions to improve his performance skill. The user would like to 
focus on a certain series of songs. The number of lessons the user will take each month is 
small but at the same time, the user tends to ask a lot of questions.  
User c: Represents the type of users who wants relatively medium level of services when 
compared to the other two types of users. Takes moderate number of lessons and subscribes to 
moderate number of instructions and asks moderate number of questions. 
Table 1 shows the users’ revealed preferences, the operator’s public offer as well as the 
results of each negotiation4. Figure 2 shows the negotiation process between the user-a and 
the operator. Point 1 represents user-a’s first proposal; its position shows user’s (inverse) 
utility and the operator’s utility from this proposal correspondingly. Point 2 represents the 
operator’s counter offer and the utilities of each player. The final point is the user’s proposal 
7. 
Gains and losses (when compared to the public offer) are analysed for each player; the results 
can be a win-win or win-loss situation. The user, as the leader of the game, achieves gains. 
The differences in gains across users stem from their different preferences and constraints. 
The operator achieves better results in two cases but a worse result in one case. In our 
simulation, the operator uses a same set of constraint update mechanism and therefore treats 
all the users similarly.  
Table 1: User revealed preferences, operator’s public offer and negotiation results  
Name Initial points Pubi
c 
offer
Final EQ Point 
 
User names a b c  a b c 
Dbsize (ksongs) 6 1 3 2 5.6 1.9 2.6 
Instructions from the teacher per lesson 2 8 4 4 2.1 6.2 3.2 
                                                        
4 Due to the limitation of our computational tool, the negotiation results are not in integer.  
Coding rate of songs (kbps, 96/128/144) 12
8 
14
4 
14
4 
114 130.7
8 
119.
3 
122.4
5 
SMS searches/lesson 7 1 3 2 6.27 1.9 3.0 
Distribution method (mobile/fixed/mixed) - 
here the user should choose a value between 
1-10 
3 9 7 5 5.89 7.3 5.6 
Number of questions student asks in 
contract period 
2 60 30 10 1 58.3 21.3
Length of contract in months 2 4 3 2 1.6 5.2 2.5 
Number of lessons/month 20 8 10 5 19.1 6.1 8.4 
User's bid for the service (euro) 10
0 
10
0 
70 30 63.7 98.6
4 
53.6
 
 
Figure 2: The negotiation process of user and the operator. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper tries to carve out a small piece of land out of the uncharted area of individual 
tariffs in mobile communication services. It aims to provide a theoretical framework to assist 
the development of computational models which can be implemented in real world 
applications. The framework is built centred on user and supplier behaviours. The user, 
instead of being fully rational, has “bounded rationality” and his behaviours are not only 
subject to economic constraints but also influenced by social needs. The supplier, which can 
be a firm, a community, or an individual, has different goals which lead to different behaviors. 
Individual tariffs are decided by the interactions between users and suppliers.   
We developed a computational model based on the conceptual framework. The model can be 
used to determine the individual tariffs between a profit-oriented supplier (firm) and an 
individual user. Preliminary results show individual tariffs can be beneficial to both the users 
and the supplier. Our next steps of work involve comparing different types of equilibria when 
the user and the supplier use different strategies and decision rules. Risk will also be 
incorporated in the model by linking individual’s utility with random distributed parameter. 
Furthermore, the computational model may be extended to the situations where the user can 
be a community instead of an individual, and also the supplier can also be a community or 
even an individual.   
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